We study a decision maker (DM) who has preferences over choice problems, which are sets of payoff allocations between herself and a passive recipient. An example of such a set is the collection of possible allocations in the classic dictator game. The choice of an allocation from the set is observed by the recipient, whereas the choice of the set itself is not. Behaving selfishly under observation, in the sense of not choosing the normatively best allocation, inflicts shame on the DM. We derive a representation that identifies the DM's private ranking of allocations, her subjective norm, and her shame. The normatively best allocation can be further characterized as the Nash solution of a bargaining game induced by the second-stage choice problem.
1. Introduction
Motivation
The notion of other-regarding preferences has attracted the attention of economists in different contexts. The relevance of this motive to decision making is intuitive and has been studied extensively. For example, in a classic dictator game, where one person gets to anonymously divide, say, $10 between herself and another person, people tend not to take the whole amount for themselves, but to give a sum between $0 and $5 to the other player (for a review, see Camerer 2003) . They act as if they are trading off a concern for fairness or for the other person's incremental wealth with a concern for their own. Thus, preferences for fairness as well as altruistic preferences have been considered (for example, Fehr and Schimdt 1999 , Andreoni and Miller 2002 , and Charnes and Rabin 2002 .
Recent experiments, however, have challenged this interpretation. For example, Dana et al. (2006) study a variant of the same dictator game, where the dictator is given the option to exit the game before the recipient learns it is being played. In case she opts out, she is given a prespecified amount of money and the recipient gets nothing. About one-third of the participants choose to leave the game when offered $9 for themselves and $0 for the recipient. Write this allocation as ($9 $0). Such behavior contradicts purely altruistic concern regarding the recipient's payoff, because then the allocation ($9 $1) should be strictly preferred. It also contradicts purely selfish preferences, as then ($10 $0) would be preferred to ($9 $0). Instead, people seem to suffer from behaving selfishly in a choice situation where they could behave pro-socially. Therefore, they try to avoid getting into such a situation, if they can. Two examples of real-life scenarios are crossing the road to avoid meeting a beggar and donating to charity over the phone, but wishing not to have been home when the call came.
We contend that a person's behavior may depend on whether it is observed by someone who is directly affected by it. In this case, we say that the choice is observed. Otherwise, we say that the decision maker chooses in private. We identify shame as the moral cost an individual experiences if instead of choosing an alternative that she perceives to be in accordance with a social norm (which might include, but is not limited to, considerations of fairness and altruism), she is observed choosing an alternative that favors her own material payoffs. 1 We refer to the criterion that determines whether an alternative causes shame when it is not chosen as the individual's (subjective) norm.
The significance of the effect of observability on behavior is supported by additional evidence. In a follow-up to the experiment cited above, Dana et al. report that only 1 out of 24 potential dictators exits the game, if he is assured that the recipient remains ignorant about the way his payoffs are determined. Similarly, Pillutla and Murnighan (1995) find evidence that even if their identity is not revealed to the recipient, people's giving behavior depends on the information given to the recipient regarding the source of the payoffs. In experiments related to our leading example, Lazear et al. (2006) as well as Broberg et al. (2007) predict and find that the most generous dictators are keenest to avoid an environment where they could share with an observing recipient. Broberg et al. further elicit the price subjects are willing to pay to exit the dictator game: they find that the mean exit reservation price equals 82% of the dictator game endowment. 1 Our notion of shame is closely related to that of embarrassment and guilt. We use the word shame to highlight that the emotional cost experienced by the decision maker (DM) is caused by her own actions. In particular, it is not triggered by others' actions, which place the DM in a socially awkward situation, as is the case with embarrassment. One way to distinguish between shame and guilt is to view guilt as involving regret, even in private, while, according to Buss (1980) , "shame is essentially public; if no one else knows, there is no basis for shame. [. . . ] Thus, shame does not lead to self-control in private." The publicprivate distinction between guilt and shame is also suggested by Gehm and Scherer (1988) . We adopt the interpretation that even observation of a selfish behavior without identification of its purveyor can cause shame. It is worth noting that in the psychological literature, one can find other criteria for the distinction between guilt and shame. For example, Lewis (1971) suggests that shame focuses on self (what we are) whereas guilt focuses on behavior (what we do). A comprehensive discussion of guilt and shame can be found in Tangney and Dearing (2002) .
To understand the notion of shame and its interaction with selfish preferences, we need to identify the effects of these two motives. A simple and tractable tool for analysis is a utility function that is additively separable in the moral cost (shame) and the private value of allocations, and that specifies the properties of the shame component. We justify using this convenient form by deriving it from plausible assumptions on preferences. To this end, we consider games like that conceived by Dana et al. as a two-stage choice problem. In the first stage, the decision maker (DM) chooses a menu-a set of payoff allocations between herself and the anonymous recipient. This choice is not observed by the recipient. In the second stage, the DM chooses an alternative from the menu. This choice is observed, in the sense that the recipient is aware of the menu available to the DM. 2 3 The DM has preferences over sets of alternatives (menus). Shame impacts preferences through its anticipated effect on second-stage choices, where the presence of a normatively better option reduces the attractiveness of an allocation. Our representation results demonstrate how the DM's norm and her choice behavior interact. On the one hand, properties of the norm impact choice; on the other hand, the norm can be elicited from the DM's choice behavior.
Illustration of results

Denote a typical menu by
where the first and second components of each alternative are, respectively, the private payoff for the DM and for the recipient. To illustrate our results, consider the special case of our representations
where u and ϕ are increasing in all arguments. The function u is a utility function over allocations and the function ϕ represents the DM's norm. The function g is interpreted as the shame from choosing a in face of the alternative that maximizes the DM's norm. It is decreasing in its first argument, increasing in its second argument, and satisfies g(z z) = 0, that is, there is no shame if a normatively best alternative is chosen.
This representation captures the tension between the DM's impulse to choose the allocation she prefers in private and her desire to minimize shame. The value of a menu is the sum of two distinct components. The first component, u(a), gives the value of the 2 The key distinction between the two stages is not the passage of physical time, but that the recipient observes the choice set that is available in stage two and not the set of menus that are available in stage one. This is in contrast to most other models of choice over menus, where subjective uncertainty might resolve or temptation may kick in over time.
3 If the exit option is chosen in the aforementioned experiment by Dana et al., the recipient is unaware that there is a dictator who can chose another allocation. In their experiment, the recipient is further unaware that another person is involved at all. It would be interesting to see whether informing the recipient that two people participate in the experiment and that the other person receives $9 would change the experimental findings.
degenerate menu {a}. A degenerate menu leaves the DM with no choice to be made under observation. We contend that there is no room for shame in this situation; the DM's ranking over degenerate menus can be thought of as her private ranking of allocations. The second component is shame. It represents the cost the DM incurs when selecting a in the face of one of the normatively best available alternatives, b * ∈ arg max b∈A ϕ(b). Although the private ranking over allocations might incorporate other-regarding preferences (such as altruism), we assume the DM to be more selfish in private: among normatively equally good alternatives, she prefers the one that gives her the highest private payoff. According to our interpretation of shame, we can relate choice to a second, induced binary relation, n , which captures the DM's subjective norm. The relation n is assumed to satisfy the following three properties: ranking, which says that n is weak order; the Pareto criterion on payoffs; and compensation, which requires the norm to be sufficiently responsive to variations in either person's payoff.
In the case of (1), the shame from choosing a in the second stage is g(ϕ(a) max b∈A ϕ(b)). This implies that even alternatives that are not chosen may matter for the value of a set and that larger sets are not necessarily better. To see this, let u(a) = 2a 1 , ϕ(a) = (a 1 + 1)(a 2 + 1), and g(x y) = y − x, so that U({(10 1) (5 3)}) = 18, U({(10 1)}) = 20, and U({(5 3)}) = 10. To permit such a ranking, we assume a version of left betweenness, which allows smaller sets to be preferred over larger sets. Theorem 1 establishes our most general representation, which captures the intuition discussed thus far.
Representations similar to (1) are studied extensively in the literature on temptation, starting with the work of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, henceforth GP) , who consider preferences over menus of lotteries and impose the independence axiom. Instead, our representation is based on choice over less complicated, risk-free objects. This domain is in line with that of our motivating examples. More importantly, imposing the independence axiom is inappropriate in our context. For example, suppose that the normative ranking of alternatives is symmetric. Then (10 0) is as good as (0 10). Independence implies that any randomization over these two allocations is as good as either of them, while intuition suggests that awarding $10 to either player with probability 0 5 would be normatively best. In addition, the linearity implied by the independence axiom means that the suggested second-stage choice correspondence satisfies the weak axiom of revealed preferences (WARP); that is, the choice criterion is menu-independent. Contrary to this, we argue that violations of WARP are plausible in our context. Our most general representation (Theorem 1) does accommodate such violations. 4 In contrast, if we take g(x y) = y − x in (1), the representation does feature a menuindependent choice criterion:
This representation is axiomatized in Theorem 2. The representation puts strong restrictions on the structure of shame-driven preferences, to the extent that second-stage choice alone does not reveal anything about the normative ranking. That is, without knowing the DM's preferences over menus, one cannot distinguish between a standard DM and a DM who is susceptible to shame.
We further specify the DM's norm by assuming that it satisfies independent normative contributions: the contribution of raising one player's monetary payoff to the normative value of an allocation does not depend on the level of the other player's payoff. With this additional assumption, Theorem 3 establishes that there are two positive, increasing, and continuous utility functions, v 1 and v 2 , evaluated in the payoff to the DM and the recipient, respectively, such that the value of their product represents the norm, ϕ(a) = v 1 (a 1 )v 2 (a 2 ). Thus, the normatively best alternative within a set of alternatives can be characterized as the Nash bargaining solution (Nash 1950) of an associated game. Since the utility functions used to generate this game are subjective, so is the norm.
Example. In representation (1), let u(a) = 2a 1 , ϕ(a) = v 1 (a 1 )v 2 (a 2 ) = (a 1 + 1)(a 2 + 1), and g(x y) = y − x. In the experiment by Dana et al. mentioned above, only whole dollar amounts are possible allocations. The set A = {(10 0) (9 1) (8 2) (0 10)} then describes the dictator game. The set A induces an imaginary bargaining game where the disagreement point gives zero utility to each player. According to the Nash bargaining solution, (5 5) is the outcome of the bargaining game. Its normative value is 6 · 6 = 36. To trade off shame with selfishness, the DM chooses the alternative that maximizes the sum 2a 1 + (a 1 + 1)(a 2 + 1), which is (6 4). Its normative value is 7 · 5 = 35 and the shame from choosing it equals 1. Hence U(A) = 11. From the singleton set B = {(9 0)}, which corresponds to the exit option in the experiment, the choice is trivial and U(B) = 18. This example illustrates both the trade-off the DM faces when choosing from a nondegenerate menu and the reason why she might prefer a smaller menu. ♦
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model and a representation that captures the interaction of the selfish and the normative rankings through shame. Section 3 isolates a choice criterion from the choice situation. Section 4 further specifies the normative ranking. Section 5 concludes by pointing out connections to existing literature. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
The model
For some k ∈ R ∪ {−∞}, let X = (k ∞) be an open interval of monetary prizes. 5 Let K be the set of all finite subsets of X 2 . Any element A ∈ K is a finite set of alternatives.
A typical alternative a = (a 1 a 2 ) is a payoff pair, where a 1 is the private payoff for the DM and a 2 is the private payoff allocated to the (potentially anonymous) other player, the recipient. Endow K with the topology generated by the Hausdorff metric, which is defined for any pair of nonempty sets, A B ∈ K, as
where d : X 2 → R + is the standard Euclidean distance.
Let be a binary relation over K. The symmetric (∼) and asymmetric ( ) parts of are defined in the usual way. Our first two axioms on are standard.
Axiom P 1 (Weak order). The relation is complete and transitive.
Axiom P 2 (Continuity). The relation is continuous.
The choice of a menu A ∈ K is not observed by the recipient, whereas the choice from any menu is. We call the impact this observation has on choice shame. The next axiom captures the idea that shame is a mental cost, which is invoked by unchosen alternatives.
We assume that adding unchosen alternatives to a set can only increase shame. Therefore, no alternative is more appealing when chosen from A ∪ B than when chosen from one of the smaller sets, A or B. Hence, A B implies A A ∪ B. 6 The second part of the axiom requires that if additional alternatives add to the shame incurred by the original choice from a menu A ∪ C, then they must also add to the shame incurred by any choice from the smaller menu A. This latter requirement rules out, for example, a situation in which shame sets in only after two allocations are sufficiently different according to, say, the Euclidean distance on X 2 . Definition 1. We say that the DM is susceptible to shame if there exist A and B such that A A ∪ B.
Shame refers to some personal norm that determines what the appropriate choice should have been. Accordingly, we define an induced binary relation, "normatively better than." Definition 2. If the DM is susceptible to shame, then we say that the DM deems b to be normatively better than a, written b n a, if ∃A ∈ K with a ∈ A, such that A A ∪ {b}. 7
The relationship A A ∪ {b} implies that b adds to the shame incurred by the original choice in A. In this case, b is normatively better than any alternative in A and, in particular, b n a. The induced relations n and ∼ n are defined as a n b ⇔ b n a a ∼ n b ⇔ both b n a and a n b Some of the axioms below are imposed on n rather than on and are labeled by N instead of P. Because n is an induced binary relation, N axioms are implicit axioms on ; n is only an expositional device. 8 The N axioms capture basic features of the norm that we assume throughout. Making those assumptions directly on n and motivating them in that context is natural.
Axiom N 1 (Ranking). The relation n is an asymmetric and negatively transitive binary relation.
Axiom N 1 rules out situations in which there are two alternatives, a and b, and two menus, A and B, with {a b} ⊂ A ∩ B, such that a contributes to shame in A and b contributes to shame in B. If this were the case, then we would have A \ {a} A and B \ {b} B, which means, in contradiction to the asymmetry of n , that both b n a and a n b. This implies that the normative value of allocations is menu-independent and, furthermore, that multiple alternatives on a menu cannot jointly contribute to shame. Instead, only one alternative in each menu, one of the normatively best, is responsible for shame. This axiom states that an alternative with higher payoffs to both individuals is normatively better. In other words, the subjective norm must have some concern for efficiency.
This axiom implies that any variation in the level of one person's payoff can always be compensated by appropriate variation in the level of the other person's payoff. In particular, Axiom N 3 requires n never to be satiated in either payoff.
The next axiom concerns the DM's preferences over singleton sets. A singleton set is a degenerate menu that contains only one feasible allocation. Since degenerate menus leave the DM with no choice to be made under observation, choosing between two singleton sets reveals the DM's private ranking of the allocations. Although the private ranking of allocations might incorporate other-regarding preferences (such as altruism), we assume the DM to be more selfish in private: if alternative a gives higher payoffs to the DM than alternative b and is also normatively better, then a must be preferred to b in private.
Axiom P 4 (Selfishness). If a 1 > b 1 and a n b, then {a} {b}. 9 10 Definition 3. Let f and h be two functions on X 2 . We say that h is more selfish than f if for all a and for all 1 and 2 such that
for at least one pair 1 , 2 .
Definition 3 is the discrete version of the requirement that the slope of a level curve of h in the (a 1 a 2 ) plane is, at any point, weakly greater than that of f . 11
Definition 4. A function ϕ : X 2 → R is called a subjective norm function if it is strictly increasing and satisfies sup x∈X ϕ(x y) > ϕ(b) and sup x∈X ϕ(y x) > ϕ(b) for all y ∈ X and b ∈ X 2 .
It is clear that if n satisfies Axioms N 1 -N 3 , then any function ϕ : X 2 → R that represents it should be a subjective norm function. Theorem 1. Relations and n satisfy Axioms P 1 -P 4 and N 1 -N 3 , respectively, if and only if there exist (i) a continuous subjective norm function ϕ, (ii) a continuous function u : X 2 → R, which is weakly increasing and more selfish than ϕ, and (iii) a continuous function g : X 2 × ϕ(X 2 ) → R, which is strictly increasing in its second argument and satisfies g(a x) = 0 whenever ϕ(a) = x, such that the function U : K → R, defined as
represents and ϕ represents n .
9 Coupled with continuity (Axiom P 2 ), Axiom P 4 implies that if a 1 > b 1 and a ∼ n b, then {a} {b}. That is, among equally good alternatives according to the normative ranking, the DM weakly prefers the one that gives her the highest private payoff.
10 Definition 2 (of n ) implies that if, in fact, a ∼ n b, then the false hypothesis that a n b cannot be refuted in a finite number of observations, as one would have to establish that there exists no menu B with b ∈ B, such that B B ∪ {a}. This renders the negative transitivity part of Axiom N 1 non-refutable whenever the violation involves indifference. Accepting Axiom N 1 , Axiom P 4 , which relates and n , is refutable. Axiom N 2 can be separated into a weak version (in which the implication is of the n type), which is refutable, and an axiom that requires that indifference curves are not "thick," which is not refutable. Axiom N 3 contains an existential quantifier and hence is not refutable independently of the induced nature of n . 11 If h and f were differentiable and the inequalities in both items (i) and (ii) were strict, then the condition would be (f 1 /f 2 )(a) < (h 1 /h 2 )(a) for all a, where f i denotes the partial derivative of f with respect to its ith component. In this case, the definition of more selfish than coincides with the definition of less altruistic than in Cox et al. (2008) .
Theorem 1 provides a representation of the DM's normative ranking based on revealed preferences. This should help the empirical quest to understand people's perception of social norms. The representation captures the tension between the DM's impulse to choose the allocation she prefers in private and her desire to minimize shame. There are at most two essential alternatives within a set, to be interpreted as the "chosen" and the "normatively best" alternative, a and b, respectively. For the latter, only its normative value, ϕ(b), matters for its impact on the set's value. Since g(a ϕ(a)) = 0 and g is strictly increasing in its second argument, g(a ϕ(b)) > 0 whenever ϕ(a) < ϕ(b), where ϕ(a) is the normative value of the chosen alternative. The representation captures the idea of shame being an emotional cost that emerges whenever the normatively best available allocation is not chosen. The properties of the function g and the max operator inside imply that the second term is always a cost (nonpositive). The other max operator implies that the DM's utility never lies below u(b), the utility of the normatively best allocation. Put differently, any deviations by the DM from choosing the normatively best allocation are in her own favor. Therefore, it is being selfish, and not being too generous, that triggers shame. The magnitude of shame may depend on the chosen allocation.
We conclude this section by mentioning the main steps of the proof. We provide intuition only for the most instructive steps. Continuity of implies that n is also a continuous preference relation. Therefore, they can both be represented by continuous functions, U : K → R and ϕ : X 2 → R, respectively. The combination of Axioms N 2 and N 3 implies that ϕ is a subjective norm function. Note that by the asymmetry part of Axiom N 1 , if {a} {a b}, then {a b} {b}. We generalize this observation to show that the combination of Axioms P 3 and N 1 implies GP's set betweenness (SB) property: A B implies A A ∪ B B. GP demonstrate that imposing SB on preferences over sets makes every set indifferent to a certain subset of it, which includes at most two elements. Hence we confine our attention to a subset of the domain that includes all sets with cardinality no greater than 2. A key step for the remainder of the proof is to show that u is more selfish than ϕ and, in particular, that for any a, there is a region in which part (ii) of Definition 3 is satisfied with strict inequality. To see this, note that if the inequality is never strict, then by Axiom P 4 , {a} {b} implies a n b. Suppose that {c} {a c} for some c. Then by SB, {c} {a}, which implies that c n a or {c} {a c}. Therefore, {a c} {c} for all c. We generalize this conclusion to show that C ∪ {a} C for all C, which implies that a n c for all c and, in particular, for c < a, violating Axiom N 2 . After establishing that u is more selfish than ϕ, we show that any set A is indifferent to some two-element subset of it that includes one of the normatively best allocations in A. Furthermore, only the normative value, ϕ, of this alternative affects the value of A. Last, we show that the shame function, g, must be strictly increasing in its second component. To see this, assume to the contrary that g(a ϕ) is positive and constant on some interval [ϕ ϕ]. Then we can find b and b such that ϕ(b) = ϕ, ϕ(b ) = ϕ, and {a} {a b} ∼ {a b } {b b }. By SB, {a b} ∼ {a b b }. Since u is more selfish than ϕ, there exists c such that {c} {a}, {c} {c b } {b }, {c b } {a b }, and ϕ(c) ∈ (ϕ(b) ϕ(b )). Then {c} ∼ {a b c} {a b b c} and by the second part of Axiom P 3 , we have {a b} {a b b }, which is a contradiction.
A second-stage choice ranking
In many situations, second-stage choice may also be observed by the experimenter. Suppose that, as suggested by Theorem 1, the correspondence that governs secondstage choice is
If the function g is increasing and convex in its second argument, then our model can accommodate a DM who does not suffer much if she deviates slightly from the normatively right behavior but considers large deviations from the norm to be unacceptable. For example, she might choose (8 2) from the set {(10 0) (8 2) (5 5)} and (10 0) from the set {(10 0) (8 2)}; while she finds her preferred allocation to be (10 0) when the normatively best available alternative is (8 2), choosing it becomes too costly in the presence of (5 5), making (8 2) the best compromise. This type of violation of the weak axiom of revealed preferences (WARP) is plausible when shame is taken into account. That said, it is also plausible that the DM's second-stage choice rule is set-independent, that is, it satisfies WARP. The next axiom strengthens the role of the normative value of the chosen alternative in determining shame: the greater the normative value of the DM's choice, the less shame she feels.
Axiom P 5 (Mitigating shame). Suppose {a} {a b} {b}. If {a } ∼ {a} and a n a, then {a b} {a b}.
For any set of two allocations {a b}, we interpret the preference ordering {a} {a b} {b} as an indication of a discrepancy between what the DM chooses (a) and the alternative she deems to be normatively best (b), which causes her choice to bear shame. This shame, however, is not enough to make her choose b. Axiom P 5 then implies that only the normative value of the chosen alternative matters for its impact on shame.
Given Axioms P 1 -P 5 and N 1 -N 3 , an additional assumption is equivalent to a setindependent choice ranking.
Axiom P 6 (Consistency). If {a a b} {a b}, then for any b , either {a a b } {a b } or {b } {a b } The qualifier says that the addition of a improves the value of {a b}, which implies that a is the (unique) choice from {a a b}. The axiom requires that a improves any other (two-element) set that includes a , unless the third alternative, b is sufficiently good. In terms of the suggested second-stage choice, the axiom implies that if a is ever the unique choice when a is available, then a is never the unique choice in the face of a.
Theorem 2. Relations and n satisfy Axioms P 1 -P 6 and N 1 -N 3 respectively, if and only if there exist a continuous subjective norm function ϕ and a continuous function u : X 2 → R, which is weakly increasing and more selfish than ϕ, such that the function U : K → R, defined as
The representation in Theorem 2 suggests a choice criterion that is independent of the choice problem: the DM's behavior is governed by maximizing ψ(a) = u(a) + ϕ(a). The value of the set is reduced by max b∈A ϕ(b), a term that depends solely on the normatively best alternative in the set. Grouping the terms differently reveals the trade-off between self-payoff, u(a), and the shame involved with choosing a from the set A,
Note that now shame takes an additively separable form and depends only on the normative value of both alternatives.
We conclude this section by remarking on the identifiability of the normative ranking. 12 Furthermore, enough violations of WARP fully identify n . 13 If there are no violations of WARP, then observing the DM's choice of menus is necessary to elicit the normative ranking of any two alternatives. This is the case where Theorem 2 applies.
Specifying a normative ranking
We now impose another axiom on n to further specify the DM's subjective norm. The axiom is known in the literature as the hexagon condition (Karni and Safra 1998) . In our context, it asserts that the contribution of one person's marginal payoff to the normative value of an allocation cannot depend on the initial payoff levels.
12 The remark is not specific to our model: it generalizes to all models that study preferences over sets of alternatives. This axiom is illustrated in Figure 1 . If a 1 = a 1 or b 2 = b 2 , this axiom is implied by Axioms N 1 and N 2 , and the continuity of n . For a 1 = a 1 and b 2 = b 2 , the statement is subtler. Consider first a stronger assumption, which is also known as the Thomsen condition (Krantz et al. 1971) .
Axiom N 4 (Strong independent normative contributions). The relationships
To motivate this axiom, assume that the DM constructs her subjective norm based on two perceived utility functions over monetary payoffs (not over allocations): one for herself and one for the recipient. At the same time, she either cannot or is not willing to compare their relative intensities. In other words, she does not make interpersonal comparisons of utilities. 14 The qualifier in Axiom N 4 establishes that the DM considers the contribution of changing her own payoff from a 1 to a 1 given the allocation (a 1 a 2 ) to be the same as that of changing the recipient's payoff from b 2 to b 2 given (b 1 b 2 ). Axiom N 4 then states that starting from the allocation (a 1 b 2 ), changing a 1 to a 1 should again be as favorable as changing b 2 to b 2 . This is the essence of independent normative contributions. The stronger qualifier (b 1 b 2 ) ∼ n (a 1 b 2 ) ∼ n (a 1 a 2 ) in Axiom N 4 weakens the axiom. For example, the normative ranking (a 1 a 2 ) n (b 1 b 2 ) if and only if min(a 1 a 2 ) > min(b 1 b 2 ) is permissible under Axiom N 4 , but not under Axiom N 4 . Krantz et al. (1971) provide an additive representation based on Axiom N 4 . Karni and Safra (1998) demonstrate that the weaker condition, Axiom N 4 , implies Axiom N 4 in the context of their axioms. The next theorem is based on those results.
Theorem 3. The relation n is continuous and satisfies Axioms N 1 -N 4 if and only if there are continuous, strictly increasing, and unbounded functions
This representation suggests an appealing interpretation of the normative ranking the DM is concerned about: she behaves as if she has in mind two positive, increasing, and unbounded utility functions on X: one for herself and one for the recipient. By mapping the alternatives within each set into the associated utility space, any choice set induces a finite bargaining game, where the imaginary disagreement point corresponds to zero utility payoffs. 15 The DM then identifies the normatively best alternative within a set as the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) of the game. Moreover, all alternatives can be normatively ranked according to the same functional, the Nash product.
One justification of the NBS as the normative best allocation is related to Gauthier's (1986) principle of "moral by agreement": trying to assess what is normative, but finding herself unable, or unwilling, to compare utilities across individuals, the DM might refer to the prediction of a symmetric mechanism for generating allocations. For example, the DM might ask what the allocation would be if both she and the recipient bargain over the division of the surplus. To answer this question, she does not need to assume the intensities of the two preferences. This is a procedural interpretation that is not built on the axioms; the DM is not ashamed of payoffs, but of using her stronger position to distribute the gains. The intuitive and possibly descriptive appeal of the NBS in many bargaining situations then makes it normatively appealing to the DM. 16 
Related literature
Other-regarding preferences are considered extensively in economic literature. In particular, inequality aversion, as studied by Fehr and Schimdt (1999) , is based on an objective function with a similar structure to the representation of second-stage choice in Theorem 2. Both works attach a cost to any deviation from choosing the normatively best alternative. In Fehr and Schmidt's work, the normatively best allocation is any equal split and need not be feasible. In our work, the normatively best available allocation is responsible for shame. The dependency of the normatively best allocation on the choice situation allows us to distinguish observed from unobserved choice.
The idea that there may be a discrepancy between the DM's preference to behave "pro-socially" and her desire to be viewed as behaving pro-socially is not new to economic literature. For a model thereof, see Bénabou and Tirole (2006) . Neilson (2009) is motivated by the same experimental evidence. He also considers menus of allocations as objects of choice. Neilson does not axiomatize a representation result, but qualitatively relates the two aspects of shame that also underlie the set betweenness property in our work: the DM might prefer a smaller menu over a larger menu either because avoiding shame compels her to be generous when choosing from the larger menu or because being selfish when choosing from the larger menu bears the cost of shame.
The structure of our representation resembles the representation of preferences with self-control under temptation, as axiomatized in GP. They study preferences over sets 15 Since v 1 and v 2 are positive, the imaginary disagreement point does not correspond to any allocation in our domain. 16 The descriptive value of the NBS has been tested empirically. For a discussion, see Davis and Holt (1993, pp. 247-255) . Further, multiple seemingly natural implementations of NBS have been proposed (Nash 1953, Osborne and Rubinstein 1994) .
of lotteries and show that their axioms lead to a representation of the form
with u GP and v GP both linear in the probabilities and where A is now a set of lotteries. In their context, u GP represents the commitment and v GP represents the temptation ranking. While the two works yield representations with a similar structure, their domainsand therefore the axioms-are different. They impose the independence axiom and indifference to the timing of the resolution of uncertainty. This allows them to identify the representation above that consists of two expected utility functionals. The objects in our work, in contrast, are sets of monetary allocations, and there is no uncertainty. Even if we did consider risky prospects, we argue in the Introduction that imposing the independence axiom is not plausible. However, one of GP's axioms is the set betweenness axiom, A B ⇒ A A ∪ B B. We show that our axioms, strong left betweenness (Axiom P 3 ) and normative ranking (Axiom N 1 ) imply set betweenness. Hence, GP's Lemma 2 can be employed, allowing us to confine attention to sets with only two elements. Epstein and Kopylov (2007) study preferences over menus of Anscombe and Aumann acts. Their representation captures the intuition that people become pessimistic as the time of consumption approaches. By treating state i as the payoff to player i and by redefining the mixture operator as convex combinations of allocations instead of the usual convex combinations of acts, their axioms can be applied to our domain. 17 While a version of their main representation can accommodate the specific dictator game experiment of Dana et al., the two works differ significantly. Applying Epstein and Kopylov's Axiom 7 (constant acts cannot be tempted) to our context implies that the DM privately weakly prefers an allocation that favors the recipient over an allocation that gives the same amount to both players if the two are equally good according to the normative ranking. If this preference is strict, it contradicts the central notion that the DM is ashamed to be selfish, which is captured by the assumption that she is more selfish in private (Axiom P 4 ). Put differently, the two models qualitatively disagree-unless the normative ranking coincides with the private ranking-once the recipient gets higher payoff than the DM. In addition, due to the definition of the mixture operation on R 2 , their axioms restrict the private ranking to be represented by a linear function, u, and the social trade-off function, ϕ, to be piecewise linear with a kink on the main diagonal. Regardless whether of such rankings are reasonable, many other private and normative rankings are excluded, which defies the purpose of eliciting these rankings from behavior.
Empirically, the assumption that only two elements of a choice set matter for the magnitude of shame (the normatively best available alternative and the chosen alternative) is clearly simplifying: Oberholzer-Gee and Eichenberger (2008) observe that dictators choose to make much smaller transfers when their choice set includes an unattractive lottery. In other words, the availability of an unattractive allocation seems to lessen the incentive to share. Last, it is necessary to qualify our leading example: the growing experimental evidence on the effect of (anonymous) observation on the level of giving in dictator games is by no means conclusive. Behavior tends to depend crucially on surroundings, like the social proximity of the group of subjects and the phrasing of the instructions, as, for example, Bolton et al. (1998) , Burnham (2003) , and Haley and Fessler (2005) record. While supported by the body of evidence mentioned in the Introduction, our interpretation is in contrast to evidence collected by Koch and Normann (2008) , who claim that altruistic behavior persists at an almost unchanged level when observability is credibly reduced. Similarly, Johannesson and Persson (2000) find that incomplete anonymity-not observability-is what keeps people from being selfish. Ultimately, experiments aimed at eliciting a norm share the same problem: since people use different (and potentially contradictory) norms in different contexts, it is unclear whether the laboratory environment triggers a different set of norms than would other situations. Frohlich et al. (2001) point out that money might become a measure of success rather than a direct asset in the competition-like laboratory environment, such that the norm might be "do well" rather than "do not be selfish." 18 Miller (1999) suggests that the phrasing of instructions might determine which norm is invoked. For example, the reason that Koch and Normann do not find an effect of observability might be that their thorough explanation of anonymity induces a change in the regime of norms, in effect telling people "be rational," which might be interpreted as "be selfish." Then being observed might have no effect on people who, under different circumstances, might have been ashamed to be selfish.
Appendix
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. Let U : K → R be a continuous function that represents . Without loss of generality, we assume that U is bounded from below. Define u(a) ≡ U({a}). Axiom P 2 implies that n is continuous and hence admits a continuous representation. Let ϕ : X 2 → R be a continuous function that represents n . By Axiom N 2 , ϕ is strictly increasing. Because n is continuous, Axiom N 3 immediately implies that if (a 1 a 2 ) n (b 1 b 2 ), then there are x and y such that (a 1 x) ∼ n (b 1 b 2 ) ∼ n (y a 2 ). In all that follows, we use this stronger version of Axiom N 3 without further discussion.
Claim 1 (Right betweenness). The implication A B ⇒ A ∪ B B holds.
Proof. There are two cases to consider:
Case 1. For all a ∈ A, ∃b ∈ B such that b n a. Let A = {a 1 a 2 a N } and C 0 = B. Define C n = C n−1 ∪ {a n } for n = 1 2 N. According to Axiom N 1 , for all a n there exists b ∈ B such that a n n b. By the definition of n , C n−1 C n . By negative transitivity of ,
18 Surely the opposite is also conceivable: subjects might be particularly keen to be selfless when the experimenter observes their behavior. This example is just meant to draw attention to the difficulties faced by experimenters in the context of norms.
Case 2. There exists a ∈ A such that a n b ∀b ∈ B.
M. By the definition of n and Axiom N 1 , ∀C such that a ∈ C, C C ∪ {b m }. Hence, C m−1 C m . By negative transitivity of ,
Combining Claim 1 with Axiom P 3 guarantees set betweenness (SB): A B ⇒ A A ∪ B B. Having established set betweenness, we can apply GP's Lemma 2, which states that any set is indifferent to a specific two-element subset of it.
Lemma 1 (GP's Lemma 2). If satisfies SB, then for any finite set A, there exist
We now use SB, Lemma 1, Axiom P 4 , and the monotonicity of ϕ to show that u is more selfish than ϕ according to Definition 3.
Claim 2. The function u is weakly increasing and more selfish than ϕ.
Proof. First, suppose that u is not weakly increasing. Then there is b > a, such that u(a) > u(b) and, therefore, {a} {b}. But b > a implies that both b n a by Axiom P 2 and b 1 > a 1 , a contradiction to Axiom P 4 .
To show that item (i) in Definition 3 holds, assume that u(a) = u(a 1 − 1 a 2 + 2 ), which implies that {a} ∼ {a 1 − 1 a 2 + 2 }. Since a 1 − 1 < a 1 , it must be that (a 1 − 1 a 2 + 2 ) n a or ϕ(a 1 − 1 a 2 + 2 ) ≥ ϕ(a). The weak inequality in item (ii) is shown similarly. Let U (a) := {a : u(a ) > u(a)} and U n (a) := {a : ϕ(a ) > ϕ(a)}. To establish that one inequality in item (ii) must be strict, we show that we cannot have a for which u(a) = u(a 1 + 1 a 2 − 2 ) implies ϕ(a) = ϕ(a 1 + 1 a 2 − 2 ) for all 1 and 2 . Suppose it was the case. Then by Axiom P 4 , U (a) ⊆ U n (a).
Step 1. There is no c such that {c} {c a}. To prove Step 1, suppose instead that there exists c such that {c} {c a}. Then by SB, {c} {a} and since U (a) ⊆ U n (a), c n a. Therefore, by definition, {c} {c a}, which is a contradiction.
Step 2. If there is no c such that {c} {c a}, then there is no C such that C C ∪ {a}. To prove Step 2, suppose instead that C C ∪ {a} for some C. By SB, there exist c c c ∈ C such that C ∼ {c c } and C ∪ {a} ∼ {c a} (c, c , and c need not be distinct). Without loss of generality, assume that c is the minimizer in C (clearly a is the minimizer in C ∪ {a}). Then {c } {c c } ∼ C C ∪ {a} ∼ {c a} {c a}, where the last is because c is one of the maximizers in C ∪ {a}. By transitivity, {c } {c a}, which is a contradiction.
Hence, by Definition 1, a n c for all c and, in particular, for c = (a 1 − ε a 2 − ε), contradicting the strict Pareto criterion (Axiom N 2 ). Proof. (i) If ϕ(b) > ϕ(a), then there exists A such that a ∈ A and A A ∪ {b}. As {a} {b}, by Axiom P 3 {a} {a b}. Conversely, if {a} {a b}, then by SB, {a} {b}, and by definition, b n a or ϕ(a) < ϕ(b).
(ii) If {b} {a}, then by SB, {b} {a b}. Since ϕ(b) > ϕ(a), Axiom N 1 implies that there is no B such that b ∈ B and B B ∪ {a}. Thus, {b} ∼ {a b}.
(iii) Relationship {a} {b} implies by SB that {a} {a b}. As ϕ(a) = ϕ(b), part (i) implies that {a} {a b} and, therefore, {a} ∼ {a b}.
Claim 4. There exists b ∈ arg max a ∈A ϕ(a ) such that A ∼ {a b} for some a ∈ A and b * (A) = b.
Proof. Assume not. Then there exist a and c such that {a c} ∼ A and (a c) = (a * (A) b * (A)). Therefore,
where the first strict inequality is because b is not one of the minimizers. But {a b} {a b c} implies c n b, which is a contradiction.
For the remainder of the proof, let I n (ϕ) := {b : ϕ(b ) = ϕ}. Define Y (a ϕ) = {b ∈ I n (ϕ) : {a} {a b } {b }}
We make the following four observations. O1. The relationships {a} {a b} {b}, {a} {a c}, and b n c imply {a c} {a b}.
O2. The relationships {a} {a b} {b}, {a} {a c} {c}, and b ∼ n c imply {a c} ∼ {a b}.
O3. The relationships b ∈ Y (a ϕ), {b} {b }, and b ∼ n b imply b ∈ Y (a ϕ).
O4. If {a} {a b} {b}, {b } {b}, and b ∼ n b, then either {a b } ∼ {a b} {b } or {a b } ∼ {b } {a b}.
To verify these observations, suppose first that O1 does not hold. Then {a b} {a c} and {a b} {b}. Then by SB, {a b} {a b c} and, therefore, c n b, which is a contradiction. If O2 does not hold, then either {a c} {a b} and {a c} {c}, which imply, using SB, that {a c} {a b c}, or {a b} {a c} and {a b} {b}, which imply, again using SB, that {a b} {a b c}. In both cases, we get a contradiction to b ∼ n c. Next suppose that O3 does not hold. Then either {b } ∼ {a b } or {a} ∼ {a b }. In the first case, {a} {a b} {b} {b } ∼ {a b }, and by SB, {b} {b b } and, applying SB again, {b} {a b b }. But then {a b} {a b b }, contradicting b ∼ n b. In the second case, {a} ∼ {a b } {a b} {b} {b } and, using SB twice, {a b} ∼ {a b b }, which is again a contradiction to b ∼ n b. To verify O4, assume {a b } {b }. Then, by Claim 3(i), {a} {a b } {b }, and by observation O2, {a b } ∼ {a b}. If, alternatively, {a b } ∼ {b }, then if {a b} {a b }, the combination of {a b} {b} and SB imply that {a b} {a b b }, which is a contradiction to b ∈ I n (ϕ(b)). Note that we cannot have {b } {a b }. Otherwise, we would have a n b ∼ n b n a, which is a contradiction.
Define f :
By definition, we have f (a a) = 0 for every a ∈ X. Note as well that
as otherwise we have
Next we claim that ϕ(b * ) summarizes the impact of b * on a two-element set.
Claim 5. There exists a function U satisfying the condition specified above such that f (a b) = g(a ϕ(b)) for some g : X 2 × R → R, which is strictly increasing in its second argument. Hence, g must be strictly increasing in its second argument whenever strict SB holds, and can be chosen to be strictly increasing anywhere else.
Let S := {(a ϕ) : Y (a ϕ) = ∅}. Note that S is an open set. Claim 6. There is g(a ϕ), which is continuous.
. Define a switch point ( a ϕ) to be a boundary point of S such that there exists b * ∈ X 2 with ϕ(b * ) = ϕ. For ϕ = ϕ( a), define g( a ϕ) := 0 and for ϕ > ϕ( a), define g( a ϕ) := u( a) − inf b∈I n ( ϕ) u(b).
Consider a sequence {(a n ϕ n )} → ( a ϕ) in S. Pick a sequence {b n } with b n ∈ Y (a n ϕ n ) ∀n. Define {b n 1 } = {min[k + 1/n b n 1 b * 1 ]}. Define b n 2 to be a solution to ϕ(b n 1 b n 2 ) = ϕ n . By Axioms N 2 and N 3 , b n 2 is well defined. Note that by observation O3 and Axiom P 4 , b n = (b n 1 b n 2 ) ∈ Y (a n ϕ n ). Last, let b n solve b n 1 = b n 1 and ϕ( b n ) = ϕ. We have U({a n b n }) = u(a n ) − g(a n ϕ n ). If in the switch point ϕ = ϕ( a), then U({ a b n }) = u( a).
If at the switch point ϕ > ϕ( a), then U({ a b n }) = u( b n ). Note that for any b ∈ I n ( ϕ), there exists N such that b n 1 < b 1 for all n > N. Since u is more selfish than ϕ, u( b n ) < u( b) for all n > N. This implies that lim n→∞ u( b n ) = inf b∈I n ( ϕ) u(b). By the same continuity argument,
For ϕ < ϕ(a), let g(a ϕ) < 0. This satisfies the constraint on f . So g can be continuous in both arguments, increasing in ϕ, and such that for any sequence {(a n ϕ n )} in S, with {(a n ϕ n )} → ( a ϕ) , we have lim n→∞ g(a n ϕ n ) = 0.
This establishes the existence of a continuous representation
of on K with the properties as specified in the theorem.
We now show the necessity of the axioms to the representation. The necessity of Axioms P 1 and P 2 is obvious. We have already shown that if g is strictly increasing, then Axiom P 3 is satisfied. For the necessity of Axiom P 4 , let H(b) := {a : ϕ(a) ≥ ϕ(a)} ∩ {a : a 1 ≥ b 1 }. Since u is more selfish than ϕ and both are increasing, H(b) ⊆ U (b), hence a ∈ H(b) implies u(a) > u(b) or {a} {b}. For Axioms N 1 -N 3 , it is sufficient to show that if a n c, then the representation provides a set C such that c ∈ C and C C ∪ {a}. Let L n (a) := {a : ϕ(a ) < ϕ(a)}. By Definition 3(ii), L n (a) ∩ U (a) = φ. There are two cases to consider.
Case 1. If c ∈ L n (a) ∩ U (a), then max{u(c) − g(c ϕ(a)) u(a)} < u(c), which implies that {c} {c a}, so take C = {c}.
To show Axiom P 4 , let H(b) := {a : ϕ(a) > ϕ(b)} ∩ {a : a 1 > b 1 }. Since u is more selfish than ϕ and both are weakly increasing, H(b) ⊆ U (b). Therefore, a ∈ H(b) implies u(a) > u(b) or {a} {b}. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 2. Given Theorem 1, Axiom P 5 implies that g(a ϕ(b)) < g(a ϕ(b)) ⇔ ϕ(a) > ϕ(a ). Therefore, g(a ϕ(b)) = g(ϕ(a) ϕ(b)), where g(ϕ(a) ϕ(b)) is strictly decreasing in ϕ(a). We now show that the function g is linear whenever it is relevant for choice (outside of that region it can always be chosen to be linear). If not, then there are a, a , b, and b such that
Conditions (i)-(iv) imply that the value of g is relevant for the four possible pairings. Condition (v) captures the nonlinearity of g. The following claim implies that the nonlinearity of g must lead to context-dependent choice.
Claim 7. There are a and a such that ϕ( a) = ϕ(a), ϕ( a ) = ϕ(a ), conditions (ii)- (iv) hold where a replaces a and a replaces a , and
This observation, in addition to the property that u is more selfish than ϕ, implies that there is a such that ϕ( a ) = ϕ(a ) and u( a ) = max{u(b) + g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b)) u(b ) + g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b ))}. By continuity, there is a such that ϕ( a ) = ϕ(a ) and for sufficiently small ε > 0,
We now show that for sufficiently small δ > 0, there is a such that ϕ( a) = ϕ(a) and Consequently, { a } { a a b} { a b}, { a b } {b } and { a b } { a a b }, which violates Axiom P 6 . Linearity of g together with the properties of g implied by Theorem 1, that is, g is increasing in its second argument and g(ϕ ϕ) = 0, imply that g(ϕ ϕ ) = β(ϕ − ϕ ). Renormalization of u and g yields the representation in Theorem 2.
Obviously the representation implies Axiom P 5 . To verify that Axiom P 6 must hold, let {a a b} {a b}. According to the representation in Theorem 2, this implies that u(a) + ϕ(a) > max{u(a ) + ϕ Proof of Theorem 3. That the representation satisfies the axioms is easy to verify. For the other direction, we first show that our Axioms N 1 -N 4 imply the axioms posed by Karni and Safra (1998) .
In addition to Axioms N 1 (Weak order) and N 4 (their hexagon condition), Karni and Safra require the following axioms.
• Independence. The relationship (a 1 a) n (b 1 a) for some a implies (a 1 b) n (b 1 b) for all b.
Independence is implied since by Axiom N 2 , (a 1 a) n (b 1 a) ⇔ a 1 ≥ b 1 ⇔ (a 1 b) n (b 1 b) for all b.
• Restricted Solvability. If (a 1 a 2 ) n (b 1 b 2 ) n (a 1 a 2 ), then there is x such that (b 1 b 2 ) ∼ n (x a 2 ). And if (a 1 a 2 ) n (b 1 b 2 ) n (a 1 a 2 ), then there is y such that (b 1 b 2 ) ∼ n (a 1 y).
Restricted Solvability is immediately implied by Axiom N 3 . A sequence {a i } is a standard sequence, if for some a = b, (a i a) ∼ n (a i+1 b) for all i. A standard sequence is bounded if there exist a and a such that for all i, a i ∈ (a a). Define similarly standard (and bounded) sequences by varying the second component.
• Archimedean Property. Every bounded standard sequence is finite.
To show that the Archimedean Property is implied, fix a = b and let {a i } be a standard sequence. If a > b, then {a i } is an increasing sequence and if b > a, then {a i } is a decreasing sequence. Suppose that {a i } is bounded away from k and ∞. Let a and a be the least upper bound and greatest lower bound, respectively.
Case 1, a > b. By Axiom N 3 , there exists x such that (a a) ∼ n (x b). By Axiom N 2 , x > a. Since {a i } is an increasing and bounded sequence, it must converge to its least upper bound, a. By continuity, there exists a subsequence {a ik } that converges to x. In particular, there exists K such that for k > K, x − a ik < ε := (x − a)/2, which is a contradiction.
Case 2, a < b. By Axiom N 2 , (a a) ≺ n (a b). Since {a i } is a decreasing and bounded sequence, it must converge to its greatest lower bound, a . By continuity, there exists I such that i > I implies (a i a) ≺ n (a b). Since a is the greatest lower bound, Axiom N 2 implies that (a b) ≺ n (a i+1 b). Therefore, (a i a) ≺ n (a i+1 b), which is a contradiction.
• Essentiality. Not (a b) ∼ n (a b) for all b or (a b) ∼ n (a b ) for all a.
Essentiality is immediately implied by Axiom N 3 (ii). Karni and Safra (1998) show (see the lemma in their paper) that their axioms imply the axioms of Krantz et al. (1971) . Hence, an additively separable representation exists, where the utilities are unique up to translation and a common linear transformation (see Theorem 2 in Chapter 6 of Krantz et al. 1971) . With this knowledge, we can create a monotone and increasing mapping a 2 → γ(a 2 ) that transforms the original indifference map to be quasilinear with respect to the first coordinate in the (a 1 γ(a 2 )) plane. Keeney and Raiffa (1976) refer to the construction of this transformation as the lock-step procedure. 20 Quasilinearity implies that there is an increasing continuous function ξ : X → R, such that ϕ(a) := ξ(a 1 ) +γ(a 2 ) represents n . Given the additively separable representation, define v 1 (a 1 ) := exp(ξ(a 1 )) and v 2 (a 2 ) := exp(γ(a 2 )). Then v 1 v 2 : X → R ++ are increasing and continuous, and if we redefine ϕ(a) := v 1 (a 1 )v 2 (a 2 ), it represents n . Note that if ϕ (a) = v 1 (a 1 )v 2 (a 2 ) also represents n , then there are α, β 1 , and β 2 , all strictly positive, such that v 1 = β 1 v α 1 and v 2 = β 2 v α 2 . The linear structure of Theorem 2 further requires that α = 1.
